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THE FORUM SELECTION DEFENSE
*

STEPHEN E. SACHS

INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to select a forum? Lawyers have written forum
selection clauses for decades without settling on an answer. Parties often agree that they can or have to sue each other in particular courts.
But what is that agreement, legally speaking? Is it just an ordinary
1
contract, to be enforced by damages for breach, or by specific per2
3
formance in equity? Is it an invocation of forum non conveniens, or
4
a “private expression” of “venue preferences,” or—as the Supreme
Court recently suggested in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S.
District Court—a permanent “waive[r] [of] the right to challenge the
5
preselected forum as inconvenient”? Is it a matter of substance or
procedure, of state law or federal? Or is it something else entirely?
Whatever forum selection might be, lawyers also disagree about
how to invoke it. Atlantic Marine closed off one method of enforcement in federal court, namely a motion to dismiss on venue grounds—
whether under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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12(b)(3). Instead, the Court suggested, defendants can try to move
the case through a § 1404(a) venue transfer or a dismissal for forum
7
non conveniens. But are these the only means available? Can a plaintiff’s violation of the agreement simply bar recovery? Would it justify
summary judgment under Rule 56, judgment on the pleadings under
8
12(c), or dismissal for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6)? Or can
9
defendants simply move “to dismiss,” without citing any Rule at all?
This Article seeks to resolve both disagreements—what forum selection is, and how it can be enforced. To start with, forum selection is
best understood as a form of waiver. When parties agree to permit suit
in a given court, they’re attempting to waive any defenses they might
have had to being sued in that court in particular. When they go further and make the agreement mandatory, requiring suit in a particular
court, they’re also attempting to waive any rights they might have had
to seek relief somewhere else. Whether these agreements are valid—
that is, whether they succeed in waiving the rights they purport to
waive—is a question of procedure, not just of contract law. And as a
procedural question, it depends on the law of the forum: state procedure in state court and federal procedure in federal court, no matter
what law gives rise to the claim.
Often a forum selection problem arises the way it did in Atlantic
Marine, with the plaintiff defying the agreement by suing in some
other (and otherwise-appropriate) federal court. If the account above
is right, and forum selection is really a matter of waiver, then the
agreement provides a reason not to let the suit proceed—at least not
in that forum. In fact, if the account above is wrong, and forum selection really is just a matter of contract, then the agreement still provides a reason not to let the suit proceed in that forum. Either way, forum selection acts as a defense, “a reason why the plaintiff should not
recover or establish that which he seeks by his complaint or peti10
tion.” More specifically, it’s an affirmative defense, one that “will de6. Id. at 577. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent references in the text to U.S. Code
sections are to Title 28, and subsequent references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
7. Id. at 579–80.
8. On Rule 12(b)(6), see Rivera v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st
Cir. 2009).
9. See Bradley Scott Shannon, Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 777
(2015).
10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (10th ed. 2014) (quoting EDWIN E. BRYANT, THE
LAW OF PLEADING UNDER THE CODES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 240 (Boston, Little, Brown &
Co. 2d ed. 1899)).
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feat the plaintiff’s . . . claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint
11
are true.”
The Federal Rules clearly explain how the defendant should raise
this defense: by “affirmatively stat[ing]” it in the answer, as Rule 8 re12
quires of “any avoidance or affirmative defense.” Often the forum
selection issue will be open-and-shut. When there’s “no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” the defendant can move immediately for
13
summary judgment under Rule 56, even before filing an answer.
When the agreement is incorporated in the complaint (as is typical in
contract cases), the defendant doesn’t need to file an answer and can
simply move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). And when the facts really are contested, the dispute should be resolved through our regular
means of finding facts—including, in a jury case, a trial by jury.
Treating forum selection as a defense might seem strange, but
there’s nothing theoretically unusual about it. The Federal Rules entertain a vast range of defenses, including arguments that are based on
procedure rather than substance, unrelated to the merits of the claim,
or valid in some courts but not others. It makes sense to handle forum
selection the way we handle other arguments designed to channel litigation. When a plaintiff’s suit is barred by a prior judgment, settlement, or arbitral award, we protect the defendant through the ordinary procedures for advancing defenses. Forum selection doesn’t need
any heavier artillery than that.
These procedures supplement rather than supplant the devices
discussed in Atlantic Marine—namely § 1404 transfer and forum non
conveniens. Both sets of remedies are available at once, and defendants and courts can choose among them. If the legal system needs any
new procedures, the right way to get them is to amend the Federal
Rules. This Article concludes with some suggestions along those lines.
But until we do that, we should use the Rules we have—under which
forum selection may be raised as a defense.

11. Id. at 509; see also id. at 361 (defining “confession and avoidance” to include the pleading of “additional facts that deprive the admitted facts of an adverse legal effect”).
12. FED. R. CIV. P 8(c)(1) (emphasis added).
13. Id. 56(a); see infra note 186 and accompanying text.
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I. FORUM SELECTION AS WAIVER
This Article contends that forum selection is really a type of waiver, grounded in the forum’s law of procedure, including federal procedure. This claim is hardly obvious. For one thing, asking what forum
selection “is really” might sound rather formalist: as a human artifact,
forum selection is whatever we say it is, and many people don’t think
of it as waiver. If our case law describes waiver as, say, “the ‘intention14
al relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,’” then small15
print forum selection clauses in adhesive contracts ain’t it. For another, the courts are persistently divided about the law that governs a
forum selection agreement, as well as the proper role of federal law
16
when state law provides the rule of decision. If anything, given that
forum selection clauses show up in contracts, it might seem obvious
that they’re creatures of contract law—matters of substance, not procedure.
This Part defends the view of forum selection as procedural waiver. This defense isn’t intended as a normative one, broadly speaking;
maybe the world would be a better place if forum selection agreements were enforced as a matter of contract, or of state procedural
law, or not at all. Nor is the defense narrowly descriptive, in the sense
of predicting future behavior by courts or directly applying existing
precedents. (After all, the courts are divided on the subject.) Instead,
the argument is a doctrinal attempt to reconcile disparate strands of
case law and to explain, in the face of judicial uncertainty, what view
of forum selection best coheres with our other legal commitments.
The argument that “forum selection is waiver” applies both to
permissive agreements, which allow resort to a particular court, as
well as to mandatory agreements, which bar the use of other courts.
While the latter are generally more controversial, the basic argument
in each case remains the same. Forum selection clauses might be
found in contracts, but that doesn’t mean that their validity is determined by—let alone determined only by—substantive contract law.
These contracts are for something unusual, namely the waiver of specific procedural rights. Only procedural law can tell us whether those
rights are waivable and, if so, when. Should a forum selection agree14. Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1835 (2012) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,
458 n.13 (2004)).
15. Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing such a clause).
16. Compare Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2014) (federal law),
with Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2014) (state law).
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ment be invoked in federal court, moreover, the rights to be waived
are federal rights. Only federal law can tell us, at least in the first in17
stance, whether and when parties can waive such rights ex ante. As a
result, the proper law to govern forum selection in federal court is the
18
law of federal procedure.
A. Forum Selection as Attempted Waiver
Agreeing to use a particular forum means waiving certain legal
rights. In a permissive agreement, the parties waive their objections to
litigating in a particular court. Personal jurisdiction and venue are
standard examples of these objections, but there might be others too.
What’s less well-recognized is that mandatory agreements, no less
than permissive ones, also represent a form of waiver: they waive the
parties’ rights to litigate in any other courts.
Because these agreements concern the parties’ procedural rights,
they necessarily involve issues of procedural law, not just contract.
19
The point here is that not all “agreements” are “contracts”; or, to put
it another way, not all agreements have their legal effect determined
exclusively by contract law. Under the Federal Rules, when parties
20
21
“agree” on discovery plans, “consent” to amended pleadings, or
22
“stipulate” to bench trials, they may or may not have formed contracts enforceable under state law. But they certainly have, through
their voluntary actions, waived certain rights regarding the court’s
procedures—rights on which they’d otherwise have been entitled to
insist. Forum selection agreements work the same way. Functionally,
they resemble stipulations more than ordinary contracts, and courts
23
have even described them in those terms. These agreements may be
found within contracts, they may be closely associated with contracts,
17. The “at least in the first instance” reflects the fact that any federal law on the topic
might, in turn, incorporate state law by reference. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440
U.S. 715, 718 (1979); Adam N. Steinman, Atlantic Marine Through the Lens of Erie, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 795, 803–04 (2015).
18. A separate issue concerns which law should be used to interpret forum selection
agreements—as opposed to determining whether, once interpreted, they are valid and enforceable. This Article takes no view on the former question, which is discussed extensively in Kevin
M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2015).
19. I owe this phrasing to William Baude.
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2).
21. Id. 15(a)(2).
22. Id. 39(a)(1).
23. Cf. Cent. Contracting Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341, 345 (3d Cir. 1966) (describing
a forum selection clause as “merely constitut[ing] a stipulation,” whereby “the parties join in
asking the court to give effect to their agreement”).
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but fundamentally they’re not just contracts: they’re also matters of
procedure.
1. Permissive Agreements
In a permissive agreement, the parties agree to allow suits in a
particular forum without trying to bar them elsewhere. At one level,
we might view these agreements as contracts like any other. The parties have made a promise to each other, and if one of them breaches
its promise—say, by objecting to (or opposing transfer to) the forum it
chose—then the promisee is entitled to some contractual remedy.
What remedy is a harder question; a court might permit a separate
24
suit for damages, it might grant specific performance by ignoring ju25
risdiction or venue objections, and so on. And maybe, as a matter of
substantive contract law, these promises won’t be enforced at all.
(Texas law, for instance, restricts the choice of an out-of-state forum
26
when the contract concerns an in-state construction project. )
At the same time, permissive forum selection isn’t just a matter of
contract. It also depends on the forum’s procedural law. Just as some
substantive rights can’t be modified by contract—think of the right to
27
28
be paid a minimum wage or to vote in a public election —the same
can be true of procedure. Subject-matter jurisdiction is the standard
29
example; the parties can’t confer this jurisdiction on a court by pri30
vate agreement, any more than they can “oust” the jurisdiction of a
31
court that already possesses it. So a promise to permit suit in a court
without subject-matter jurisdiction will never be enforced with specific performance: the court can’t ignore the promisor’s jurisdictional ar32
gument, even if his making the argument is itself a form of breach.

24. See Dodson, Atlantic Marine, supra note 1, at 687.
25. See Staring, supra note 2, at 409–11; cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 12 (1972) (describing an exclusive forum selection clause in such terms).
26. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 272.001 (Vernon 2011) (making such clauses voidable by the party performing the construction).
27. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neill, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).
28. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 597 (2012) (prohibiting expenditures for withholding votes);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. b (1981) (“[W]hen an agreement involves
a serious crime or tort, [its] unenforceability is plain.”).
29. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction,
because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.”); accord
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
30. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
31. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
32. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
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And given that the promisee in such a case has no real right to expect
performance, maybe damages should be unavailable too—just as they
would be for breach of a promise to work at less than the minimum
33
wage, or a promise not to vote.
In other words, to know whether a permissive agreement has legal
effect, we can’t just look to the governing contract law; we need to
know the procedural law too. While some procedural rules can’t be
modified by agreement, others can. In federal courts, for example,
34
personal jurisdiction over a defendant can be obtained by consent,
35
including consent expressed in a prior agreement. Venue objections
36
37
can also be waived, before a dispute as well as after. If a party
agrees to permit suit in a particular federal district, and is actually
sued there, part of why the agreement “works” is that it’s understood
to waive the defendant’s personal jurisdiction or venue objections, allowing the suit to proceed in that forum.
Courts don’t recognize these waivers because contract law somehow trumps procedure, or because the parties are somehow entitled
38
to override whatever the law actually requires. Rather, our procedural law just happens to recognize a role for private understandings
when allowing rights to be waived. Courts have sometimes permitted
ex ante waivers of various rights relating to discovery, limitations periods, the admissibility of evidence, burdens of proof, jury trials, reme39
dies, cost- or fee-shifting, appeal rights, and so on; and, of course, parties are also allowed to settle their underlying claims. People disagree
40
on whether these procedural waivers are good or bad, just as they
41
disagree about the merits of settlement. But for the moment, and
33. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 185 (“To the extent that a term requiring the occurrence of a condition is unenforceable . . . , a court may excuse the non-occurrence
of the condition unless its occurrence was an essential part of the agreed exchange.”). But cf.
Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253 (1991) (noting
that many contracts unenforceable in equity may sometimes still be enforceable at law).
34. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703.
35. Id. at 704 (citing Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964)).
36. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960).
37. Compare Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 441–44 (1946) (involving consent before suit), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) (providing that venue defenses are waived if not
timely asserted).
38. On parties trumping law, see generally Dodson, Atlantic Marine, supra note 1; Dodson, Party Subordinance, supra note 1.
39. See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1343–51 (2012).
40. See id. at 1333–34 & nn.21–24 (collecting sources).
41. For canonical statements of the opposing positions, compare Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Con-
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subject to various conditions, permissive forum selection agreements
usually succeed in waiving what the parties are trying to waive.
2. Mandatory Agreements
Understanding permissive agreements as a form of waiver is easy
enough. But mandatory agreements close courthouse doors rather
than open them. At first glance, they might look less like waivers and
more like contractual constraints. What rights, after all, could a mandatory agreement waive?
What mandatory agreements waive is the parties’ right to litigate
in other courts. We usually don’t talk about the right to sue in a particular court as something separate and distinct from the right to sue
in general. But as the Supreme Court explained in CompuCredit
Corp. v. Greenwood, a statute might confer a substantive right and
create a cause of action—granting a right to sue, in general—without
conferring on the plaintiff an equal right to sue “in all competent
42
courts.” In fact, even a nonwaivable substantive right needn’t imply
“a nonwaivable right to initial judicial enforcement in any competent
judicial tribunal” or “disabl[e] the parties from adopting a reasonable
43
forum-selection clause.” It’s precisely because the right to sue in a
particular court is distinct from the right to sue in general—and because the former may be waivable ex ante, even when the latter is
not—that “the contemplated availability of all judicial forums may be
44
reduced to a single forum by contractual specification.”
This isn’t as strange as it sounds, because the law often lets potential plaintiffs waive various litigation rights in advance. For example,
they might agree to shorten the relevant time limits on a claim, thereby waiving their otherwise-guaranteed rights to sue during the last
45
portion of the statutory limitations period. Or they might agree to
46
submit to a pre-suit examination under oath, effectively waiving
47
their rights to file unverified complaints. Or they might agree to limit
sent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19.
42. 132 S. Ct. 665, 671 (2012).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Bone, supra note 39, at 1347 & n.73 (“Parties are free to shorten an applicable
statute by agreement as long as the shorter period is reasonable.”); see also 31 RICHARD A.
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 79:10 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter WILLISTON]. But cf. Dodson, Party Subordinance, supra note 1, at 18 (questioning “what law”—other than the contractual condition—“authorizes such a dismissal”).
46. See Pervis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 901 F.2d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 1990).
47. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a
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49

the evidence that they’ll introduce or the remedies that they’ll seek.
Each of these represents an ex ante waiver of a particular litigation
right that might otherwise be considered part of a general right to sue.
These waivers can’t be analyzed as simple contract obligations.
Some courts have described mandatory forum selection that way—as
creating a “condition precedent to suit under the contract,” namely
50
that the suit be brought in a particular place. But while the Supreme
Court has sometimes used similar language, describing forum selec51
52
tion as a “contractual obligation” or a “contractual right,” it’s a very
special kind of right—namely, a “right to limit trial to [a particular] fo53
rum.” Whether a contract succeeds in granting that right depends not
only on contract law, but also on whether the plaintiff’s right to sue in
other courts can lawfully be waived. Parties can write whatever conditions precedent they want (say, that in order to recover, they have to
abstain from voting in federal elections). But unless those conditions
themselves are legally permissible, they’ll be unenforceable as against
public policy, just as forum selection agreements were often held to be
54
under the pre-Bremen regime. So whether a contract actually succeeds in requiring a certain forum isn’t just a question of contract.
Viewing mandatory forum selection as a kind of waiver also
makes more sense of the Court’s reworking of venue transfer in Atlantic Marine. Ordinarily, as the Court noted, district courts considering a transfer (or a forum non conveniens dismissal) “evaluate both
the convenience of the parties and various public-interest considera55
tions.” The parties to mandatory agreements “waive the right to challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient,” leaving the decision
56
subject only to public-interest considerations. But according to the
Court, that’s not all they waive. In an ordinary § 1404 transfer, the
“state law applicable in the original court also appl[ies] in the trans57
feree court.” Under Atlantic Marine, though, a new choice of law is
necessary; “[t]he court in the contractually selected venue should not
pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit.”).
48. See Bone, supra note 39, at 1349 & n.80.
49. See id. at 1350 & nn.87–88.
50. Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
51. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 (2013).
52. Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499 (1989).
53. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 874 (1994).
54. See 7 WILLISTON, supra note 45, § 15:15.
55. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581.
56. Id. at 581 n.6, 582.
57. Id. at 582.
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apply the law of the transferor venue to which the parties waived
58
their right.” In other words, even though the plaintiff otherwise had
every right to sue in the transferor court, and even though jurisdiction
and venue were perfectly proper, the agreement selecting the transferee forum waived the plaintiff’s right to any other forum, and not
just its right to raise certain arguments about convenience. By entering the agreement, the Court reasoned, the plaintiff “effectively exercised” its traditional privilege to choose the forum, and so enjoyed no
59
further privilege to choose a different one.
B. Forum Selection and Forum Law
Seeing forum selection as attempted waiver helps explain which
law governs the attempt’s success or failure. Whether a given right can
be waived depends in part on the law that confers it. We might look to
contract law to identify the parties’ promises, but that’s not the only
place to look. When the underlying rights relate to suit in particular
courts (as opposed to the ability to recover in general), they’re conferred by procedure, not substantive law.
This has important consequences for choice of law, because the
federal government and the several states often enforce forum selection agreements differently. While some courts have mistaken forum
selection for a pure contract question, to be determined by whatever
state’s substantive law “governs the rest of the contract in which the
60
clause appears,” procedural questions are almost universally deter61
mined by forum law. Whether permissive or mandatory, a forum selection agreement has its validity determined by the law of the forum.
1. Permissive Agreements
To keep things simple, let’s start with state courts, avoiding for the
62
moment any issues posed by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. Suppose
that two parties in Texas form a permissive agreement, entitling each
to sue the other in a Virginia forum. If that Virginia court would have
58. Id. at 583.
59. Id. at 582 (“[W]hen a plaintiff agrees by contract to bring suit only in a specified forum
. . . the plaintiff has effectively exercised its ‘venue privilege’ before a dispute arises.” (quoting
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635 (1964)); see also id. at 583 (“[A]s discussed above, a
plaintiff who files suit in violation of a forum-selection clause enjoys no such ‘privilege’ with respect to its choice of forum . . . .”).
60. Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (1934).
62. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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been available for these lawsuits anyway, then the parties’ agreement
does no work; it simply preserves the status quo ante, under which
they’d have been free to sue there or somewhere else. So the only case
that matters is one in which the Virginia court would otherwise have
been unavailable for some reason, but now might be available as a result of the permissive agreement. But if there’s some potential bar to
the plaintiff’s filing in Virginia, we need to know what that bar is, and
whether the agreement is enough to lift it—something that’s a question of Virginia procedure, not Texas contract law. For instance, if the
Virginia court thinks it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction even after the
agreement, then it won’t hear the case—no matter how enforceable
Texas contract law thinks the agreement ought to be. Only Virginia
63
can define the jurisdiction of its own courts.
On the other hand, if Virginia thinks that (say) parties can consent
to personal jurisdiction through an agreement like this one, then it
doesn’t really matter whether Texas treats forum selection agreements as valid or not. Regardless of whether the parties have a “contract” as Texas defines the term, both of them signed a piece of paper
that purported to consent to suit in Virginia. That fact, standing alone,
might satisfy Virginia’s requirements for waiving jurisdiction or venue
objections in its own courts. If a defendant manifested consent to jurisdiction by announcing it in an unsolicited letter, writing it in blood
on the state capitol, hiring a skywriter to fly over the courthouse, or
just shouting it from the rooftops at 3 a.m., that might be enough for
Virginia’s courts—even if Texas contract law requires mutual assent,
64
consideration, or a writing under the Statute of Frauds. Parties can
waive legal arguments in lots of different ways, through many differ65
ent patterns of conduct, and not just through binding contracts.
At the same time, it’s hardly surprising that states might often
choose to incorporate various aspects of the governing contract law.
For instance, to decide whether an agent who signed an agreement actually had power to bind his principal, Virginia needn’t generate its
own in-house law of “procedural agency”; it might just borrow whatever agency law governs the contract as a whole. And it might do the

63. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 314 (2006) (noting that jurisdiction is controlled
“by the law of the court’s creation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
64. Cf. Kim v. Son, No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2009) (refusing
to enforce a gratuitous promissory note written in blood).
65. See, e.g., Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs., 508 F.3d 1062,
1064–65 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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same with principles of offer and acceptance (like the mailbox rule),
novations, rescission, and so on. The whole point of contract law is to
help us attach legal consequences to otherwise-empty promises, so it’s
natural that we’d look to those doctrines when distinguishing loose
words from real waivers. But just as we occasionally suspend our
regular contract rules to make some promises atypically enforceable
(say, in promissory estoppel) or atypically unenforceable (say, for public policy reasons), so we might occasionally suspend our regular
66
“whole law” of contracts when our procedural doctrines so require.
The exact balance between procedure and other sources of law—
and, in turn, between forum law and that of other states—not only
depends on which forum we’re in, but also on the precise legal question being asked and the precise remedy being sought. When the
plaintiff sues in Virginia and the defendant asserts a lack of personal
jurisdiction, what weight to give the forum selection agreement is an
issue of Virginia personal jurisdiction law—at least to start with.
When the plaintiff sues in Texas and the defendant wants a forum non
conveniens dismissal, only Texas can say whether its courts recognize
forum non conveniens at all, let alone what role the parties’ agree67
ment should play in administering it. And when a party wants to enforce a forum selection agreement through other contractual remedies (like damages for breach) that don’t require any change to the
procedures, we need to look to the contract law that makes those
remedies available. But none of this changes the fact that a permissive
forum selection clause purports to waive certain procedural defenses
in a particular forum, and whether it “works” to waive those defenses
has to be determined by that forum’s procedural law.
2. Mandatory Agreements
The case for applying forum law to mandatory agreements takes a
little more explanation. If filing in the right court is a “condition prec68
edent to suit under the contract,” then that condition presumably
operates anywhere the contract might be invoked. By disregarding it,

66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (“A court usually applies
its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case.”).
67. Though a forum non conveniens analysis in Texas might then cross-reference the law
of other states—for instance, asking whether Virginia might be an adequate alternative forum,
see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981), which depends in part on what
Virginia courts will do.
68. Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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a new forum would be unduly enlarging one party’s contract rights to
the other’s disadvantage. Likewise, if the condition was invalid where
formed, then perhaps it should be equally invalid everywhere, and so
on.
But on a closer examination, mandatory agreements look a lot
more like permissive ones. Suppose that the two parties in Texas had
agreed to sue only in Virginia—and that the plaintiff instead filed in
Maine. Maybe every state would see Texas law as governing the contract generally and determining the parties’ substantive rights. Yet
Texas law can’t always control the list of courts in other states in
which these rights will be enforced. That’s because the right to sue in
some other state’s court is generally determined by that other state’s
law. Under traditional conflicts doctrines, the “local law of the forum,”
not the law governing the substance of the claim, “determines which
of [the forum’s] courts, if any, may entertain an action on a claim in69
volving foreign elements.” The Maine court, acting under Maine’s
law of procedure, may have proper jurisdiction over the parties and
subject matter and be otherwise seised of the case, giving the plaintiff
a perfectly good right to sue there. Whether and when that right is
waivable ex ante depends, at least in part, on the Maine law that
grants the right in the first place. In other words, even if a contract
purported to make suit in the chosen forum a condition precedent to
recovery, that condition might still be inconsistent with Maine’s public
70
policy, just like a term claiming to oust the Maine courts of jurisdiction.
Alternatively, suppose that Texas law would call this contractual
condition invalid—say, because it showed up in a construction contract, wasn’t in writing, lacked consideration, etc. In that case, it might
lack force as a “contract,” but it still might have force as a waiver. Just
as Maine can adopt its own statute of limitations to guard against
71
stale claims, or its own doctrines of “unclean hands” to prevent its
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 123; accord RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 586 (1934); cf. id. § 617 (“An action can be maintained on a
foreign cause of action although by the law of the state which created the right, it is required
that suit shall not be brought outside the state.”).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 50–54; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 6 (including as “factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law” any “relevant policies of the forum”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 cmt. a (describing “the procedural policy of the forum” as “requir[ing] the courts to apply certain local
rules in the course of the litigation to enforce the local notions concerning the manner and
method in which the courts of that state should function”).
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 142–143 (1971);
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72

courts from becoming instruments of injustice, so too it can adopt its
73
own understanding of civil waiver (absent some federal override),
74
and find “justice [to be] served by holding parties to their bargain.”
As in CompuCredit, Texas’s mere choice to create a cause of action
75
doesn’t automatically “guarantee suit in all competent courts.” Even
if Texas tried to guarantee suit in other courts, it couldn’t make good
on that guarantee when those courts are found in other states. Maine
courts might respect a Texas guarantee, but then again they might not;
the answer depends on forum procedure.
In fact, were we inclined to treat the forum selection agreement as
purely contractual, we’d still need to look to Maine law to know how
to enforce it. Assuming that the contract were otherwise valid, a defendant trying to bar suit in Maine would be seeking a particular kind
of remedy for breach, namely specific performance of a promise not
76
to sue there. But while the validity of a contract, in general, might
depend on another state’s law, “whether equitable remedies . . . are
available” for breach—and, if so, which ones—is traditionally deter77
mined by “[t]he local law of the forum.” So here, too, forum law controls.
C. Forum Selection and Federal Law
Turning from state to federal courts complicates matters greatly.
Erie and its progeny generally require federal courts, when not deciding matters of state law, to act like state courts in the states in which
78
they sit. Is the validity of a forum selection agreement a matter of
federal law, or do the federal courts have to copy state practice? The
79
Supreme Court has long avoided the question, the courts of appeals

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 603–604 (1934).
72. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 601.
73. E.g., Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009) (Supremacy Clause); Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609 (1951) (Full Faith and Credit Clause).
74. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 671 (2012).
76. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (describing the issue as
whether the district court should have “specifically enforc[ed] the forum selection clause”); see
also Staring, supra note 2, at 410–11.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 131 cmt. a (1971); see also
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 590 cmt. a (same rule for “injunction[s]”).
78. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (citing Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–77 (1938)).
79. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.5; Stephen E. Sachs, Five Questions After Atlantic
Marine, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 766–68 (2015).
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are divided on it, and scholarly commentators are no less split.
There’s a reason for this: as Erie questions go, this one is particularly
difficult. But if forum selection is really about procedure, then the
case for federal law may be stronger than we thought.
1. Why the Problem Is Hard
The first thing to note is that this problem is a hard one: the “obvious” arguments for either side generally misfire. On the one hand,
it’s not enough to argue, as the Seventh Circuit has done, that forum
selection agreements are part of contracts, and that “[t]here is no gen82
eral federal law of contracts after Erie.” As explained at length
above, whether parties can waive procedural rights in advance is an issue of procedure, not just contract. The Seventh Circuit has made the
same argument—and the same error—with regard to waivers of the
federal right to jury trial. There, the right itself is clearly federal in na83
ture (guaranteed by the Constitution and the Federal Rules), and
federal courts often permit ex ante waiver, as a matter of federal ra84
ther than state law. The Seventh Circuit found it “inconsistent[]” to
use federal “standards of ‘waiver’” to assess “components of other85
wise-valid contracts” governed by state law. But it’s not quite so

80. The Seventh Circuit takes the agreement’s validity as governed by state law, namely
“the law of the jurisdiction whose law governs the rest of the contract in which the clause appears.” Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Abbott Labs.
v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007)). But many other circuits favor federal
law instead. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2014); Albemarle
Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2010); Wong v. Party-Gaming Ltd.,
589 F.3d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 2009); Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527,
538 (8th Cir. 2009); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F. 3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009); Ginter ex rel. Ballard v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 2008); P & S Bus. Machs.,
Inc. v. Canon USA, Inc., 331 F.3d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
81. Compare, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers from Unconscionable Contractual Forum Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 732
(2015) [hereinafter Mullenix, Gaming the System] (suggesting that state law applies under Erie
and Klaxon), Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 314–15 (1988) [hereinafter
Mullenix, Another Choice] (same), and Steinman, supra note 17, at 804–10, 818–19 (same), with
Clermont, supra note 18, at 666 (arguing that federal interests in forum selection “should prevail”), and Julia L. Erickson, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine
and Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1090,
1092 (1988) (endorsing “limited federal common law”).
82. IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 991–92 (7th
Cir. 2008).
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; FED. R. CIV. P. 38–39.
84. See, e.g., Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988);
Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832–33 (4th Cir. 1986).
85. IFC Credit, 512 F.3d at 994.
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strange, when dealing with a right “essential” to the federal system,
to use federal standards to decide whether and when the right can be
waived. So the fact that contract law is generally state law, not feder87
al, doesn’t tell us what we need to know.
On the other hand, despite what many courts have held, labels like
88
“procedure” don’t answer the question either. The Rules Enabling
89
Act differentiates between “procedure” and “substantive right[s],”
90
but those words don’t show up in the Rules of Decision Act, which
91
applies in the absence of a Federal Rule. Under that statute, federal
courts have to use state laws as rules of decision in all “cases where
92
they apply.” And the law that “appl[ies]” to a procedural question
has frequently been held, rightly or wrongly, to be the law of the fo93
rum state—whether the question involves limitations periods, the
94
95
powers of judges and juries, or even choice of law itself. So the issue
we’re left with is whether a federal court in, say, the District of Maine
can enforce an independent federal doctrine of forum selection, or
whether it has to borrow Maine procedures and ensure consistency
with Maine’s courts.

86. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958),
87. See Mullenix, Another Choice, supra note 81, at 314–15.
88. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Questions of
venue and the enforcement of forum selection clauses are essentially procedural, rather than
substantive, in nature, and therefore should be governed by federal law.” (emphasis and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2012).
90. Id. § 1652.
91. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448
(2010).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
93. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 603–604 (1934) (treating
statutes of limitations as procedural matters governed by forum law), and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 142–143 (1971) (retaining much of this rule), with Guar.
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (requiring federal courts to use the limitations periods
of the states in which they sit).
94. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 129 (“The local law of
the forum determines whether an issue shall be tried by the court or by a jury.”), and
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 592 (same), with Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (requiring federal judges to use state standards when reviewing jury awards).
95. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (describing conflict of
laws as “part of the law of each state” that might hear a case), and RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (same), with Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496
(1941) (requiring federal courts to borrow state choice-of-law principles).
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2. The Case for Federal Law
Notwithstanding the question’s difficulty, it still has an answer:
namely, that federal law determines validity. That answer might seem
surprising. On the modern Erie analysis, there’s a strong argument for
conformity with state procedure. When there’s no controlling federal
96
statute or enacted rule, we have to “wade into Erie’s murky waters,”
deciding whether the “twin aims” identified in Hanna v. Plumer—
“discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
97
administration of the laws”—favor state law. As both judges and
scholars have noted, different rules on forum selection could easily
lead to different results in different courts and among different par98
ties. If the state court would reject an agreement while the federal
court would accept it, then who wins or loses the case might come
99
down to the “accident of diversity jurisdiction.” So, the argument
goes, state procedure necessarily applies—or, to say mostly the same
thing, the federal court ought to enforce a federal common law rule
100
that incorporates state law by reference.
But this modern analysis isn’t the only one. The Supreme Court
has also recognized a range of “countervailing federal interests” that
101
can justify independent federal rules. Forum selection clearly implicates those interests, and the federal courts regularly apply their own
set of independent rules. And while the Supreme Court occasionally
borrows state standards as a matter of policy, there are strong policy
as well as structural arguments for an independent federal standard
governing the right to a federal forum.
a. Forum Selection and Federal Interests
To start with, it should be “plain that the Federal Government’s
interest . . . is implicated” by a forum selection agreement that affects
federal litigation, “even though the dispute is one between private
102
parties.” A permissive agreement, for example, attempts to lift a
procedural bar to suit in a given court. To know whether it succeeds,

96. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437.
97. 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
98. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37–38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Steinman, supra note 17, at 804–08.
99. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 751 (2012).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 718 (1979); Steinman, supra note 17, at 810.
101. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996).
102. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988).
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we need to know what kind of bar we’re talking about; and if the bar
itself comes from federal law, then federal law ordinarily specifies the
conditions under which it lifts. If the parties chose a federal court that
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, for instance, it’d be obvious that
state rules on forum selection wouldn’t matter; the jurisdiction of any
103
court is always “determined by the law of the court’s creation.”
Similarly, a mandatory agreement that promised to sue only in
certain courts—say, those located in Virginia—necessarily includes a
promise not to sue in other courts, including otherwise-appropriate
federal courts in Maine. That kind of promise is a natural subject for
federal regulation, just like a promise not to vote in certain federal
elections for which the party might otherwise be legally eligible. (The
parties’ agreement might not mention federal courts specifically, but
that doesn’t mean much; a promise to vote “only in Virginia municipal
elections” clearly includes a promise not to vote in federal ones, and
104
would be just as illegal to procure. )
According to the Supreme Court, this kind of federal interest is “a
necessary, [but] not a sufficient, condition for the displacement of
105
state law.” We still need to know whether state law creates any “sig106
nificant conflict” with “an identifiable federal policy” on the topic. If
107
“there can be no other law” to apply, then state law wins by default.
As it happens, though, there is other law here, namely the standards of
waiver that federal courts apply in cases involving purely federal issues. In fact, there are multiple such standards. Waivers of federal constitutional rights, for example, face a “‘high standar[d]’” of being
108
“knowing, intelligent, and voluntary”; but waivers of less vital rights
are handled in a different way. As to permissive agreements, the Court
considered it “settled” half a century ago “that parties to a contract
may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to
permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive no109
tice altogether.” And as to mandatory ones, when the forum selec103. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 314 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 597 (2012).
105. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
106. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965)).
108. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)).
109. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964). But cf. id. at 332
(Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that “a printed form provision buried in a multitude of words”
may be “too weak . . . to be treated as a waiver of so important a constitutional safeguard”).
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tion issue is entirely out of the state’s hands (in admiralty cases, for
example), the federal courts will enforce the agreement if it’s “unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power,”
110
and if it’s neither “unreasonable” nor “unjust.” Assuming that these
practices are correct—they may not be—there’s a significant potential
for conflict between state and federal law.
b. The Merits of a Federal Standard
One might think, given this conflict, that the analysis should be
simple. Either the states have power to regulate here—in which case
their law controls—or they don’t, and some separate standard has to
govern instead. “[B]y definition,” Caleb Nelson has written, “‘federal’
common law operates only where something has displaced or restrict111
ed the states’ lawmaking powers.” In the forum selection context,
that “something” is the federal right to a federal forum, which state
law can neither extend nor deny. With respect to permissive agreements, for example, to say that state law conclusively determines the
agreement’s validity is to say that a state, by legislation, can force a
federal court to take a case it finds otherwise barred by the federal
law of jurisdiction or venue—or can prevent a federal court from lifting the bar, when it’d be otherwise inclined to do so. Letting the state
decide might make sense if the bar itself were a creature of state law.
But when the bar is federal, it’s hard to see where the state gets this
power—“a right,” as M‘Culloch v. Maryland put it, “in one government to pull down, what there is an acknowledged right in another to
build up; . . . a right in one government to destroy, what there is a right
112
in another to preserve.” A few years later, in Wayman v. Southard,
Chief Justice Marshall explicitly rejected the idea that states could
“control the modes of proceeding in suits depending in the Courts of
the United States,” something “[n]o gentleman, we believe, will be so
113
extravagant as to maintain.”

110. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12, 15 (1972); accord Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991) (clarifying that forum selection clauses in form
contracts are subject to the same standards).
111. Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1, 3
(2015).
112. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 210 (1819).
113. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 49 (1825); cf. Michael S. Green, Vertical Power, 48 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 73, 88 (2014) (arguing that it is “impermissible for state officials to [regulate federal
procedure] indirectly, by taking laws that apply to their own courts and extending them to federal courts within the state”).
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Under the modern Erie analysis, though, the Supreme Court has
claimed for itself the right to “adopt[], as the federally prescribed rule
of decision, the law that would be applied by state courts,” unless
114
there’s a “need for a uniform federal rule.” In other words, while the
law of federal forum selection has to be federal, it might copy statelaw standards within each state, so long as the Court thinks that that’s
a good idea. Borrowing state law has the advantage of unifying the results between diverse and nondiverse parties, and between various
courts located in the same state. What advantages does a uniform federal rule confer?
i. Policy.—On a superficial level, a single federal standard has a
number of policy advantages. Hanna’s language about the “discour115
agement of forum-shopping” seems rather out of place when the
whole issue is about selecting a forum. The Bremen specifically encouraged federal courts to enforce ex ante agreements like these to
help the parties avoid surprises. But “[t]he elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both par116
ties” is simply impossible if the agreement itself might have to be
reviewed under any of fifty different state standards. Indeed, the fact
that the parties might specifically choose to litigate only in state
courts, or only in federal ones, makes it far less necessary for those
state or federal courts to handle the issues the same way. (An agreement not to remove to federal court, for example, could only be relevant in a federal forum, so it’s not clear a state court needs any opinion at all on what should happen once it’s invoked.)
On this Article’s approach, moreover, there’s less to be feared
from a divergence between state and federal courts within the same
state. Suppose the parties have a mandatory agreement excluding all
courts in a given state, which the federal court there would honor but
which a state court would ignore. If, as explained below, the federal
court would dismiss an action filed contrary to the agreement, then
the plaintiff could simply refile in state court. If the defendant tried to
remove, the plaintiff could seek remand or forum non conveniens
dismissal in favor of the state court in which, by assumption, he had
117
not waived his right to sue. (The federal court would have no inter-

114. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001); see also United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 718 (1979).
115. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
116. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13.
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012) (discussing motions to remand on bases other than sub-
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est in keeping the case away from the state court; waiver is forum law,
118
after all, and the plaintiff hadn’t waived any right to sue there. ) In
other words, both court systems could fully implement their policies
at one and the same time; the very structure of forum-selection-aswaiver can often make divergence between state and federal courts a
non-issue.
The same goes for the other “aim[] of the Erie rule,” the “avoid119
ance of inequitable administration of the laws.” The usual worry
here is that, in practice, too much of the parties’ legal relationship will
120
rest on the “accident of diversity jurisdiction.” But forum selection
only arises as a federal issue if the agreement applies to federal courts
in particular. The parties could always agree to sue or not to sue in
particular state courts, while wholly disclaiming any effect on federal
courts; in that case, their agreement wouldn’t ever be relevant in a
federal forum, as it would have deliberately exempted federal courts
from its scope. We only get started with the Erie question once the
parties have made an agreement that addresses the federal courts in
particular. (Again, we wouldn’t need any explicit reference to the federal system, any more than a contract to vote “in Virginia municipal
elections only” needs to explicitly mention federal elections in order
to rule them out.)
In other words, to make a forum selection agreement relevant to
federal courts, the parties have to make a particular choice whether or
not to specify a federal forum. But the only parties who could possibly
make such an agreement are those whose claims might be eligible for
federal jurisdiction in the first place; a promise regarding litigation in
federal courts is meaningless if the parties couldn’t litigate there anyway. So the standard assumption underlying Erie, that diverse and
nondiverse parties are similarly situated, no longer applies. If diversity
is the only reason why a party has a right to a federal forum, then diversity can explain the use of federal standards for whether and when
that right is waived. There’s nothing accidental about it.

ject-matter jurisdiction); 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3721, at 97–98 & nn.140–141 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing remands to enforce waivers of the right to remove); see also Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568,
580 (2013) (endorsing forum non conveniens dismissal in favor of state or foreign courts).
118. And if the federal court sends the case elsewhere under § 1404, it does so only according to federal statutory standards, which take independent account of the parties’ desires. See
Sachs, supra note 79, at 769–71.
119. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
120. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 751 (2012).
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ii. Structure.—On a deeper level, there are strong structural reasons for the federal courts to maintain an independent standard for
identifying waiver. As the Court has reminded us, “[t]he federal system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants
121
who properly invoke its jurisdiction.” When ordinary tests might call
for state law, the federal judiciary can still follow its own standards to
122
preserve an “essential characteristic of that system.” How to allocate
cases across federal districts might not seem quite as “essential” as
123
how to “distribute[] trial functions between judge and jury,” the
most famous example of this kind. But it’s a distinctively federal function, one arguably “committed by the Constitution and laws of the
124
United States to federal control.”
In a permissive agreement, for example, defendants might agree to
waive their federal venue objections. Those kinds of objections are
uniquely federal. States may or may not have any analogues to venue,
and such analogues needn’t resemble the lines between federal districts. In that case, the direct adoption of state standards would be impossible. Or the parties might consent to personal jurisdiction in the
federal courts, whether or not they similarly consent to the jurisdiction of state courts. When the Supreme Court approved ex ante waivers of personal jurisdiction, for instance, it did so based on “general
principles,” refusing to “assume that this uniform federal standard
125
should give way to contrary local policies.”
With respect to mandatory agreements, the conflict between state
and federal standards becomes even sharper. These standards might
differ in one of two ways: either a state court might enforce the
agreement when a federal court wouldn’t, or the other way around.
When the state is the one favoring enforcement, it’s hard to see
how its preferences could lawfully interfere with a federal case. Imagine a mandatory forum selection agreement that fails The Bremen’s
standards—one that’s unjust and unreasonable, that resulted from
overweening bargaining power (say, a gun to the plaintiff’s head), and
so on. Maybe the state courts would enforce it anyway; but a federal
court, seised with jurisdiction and proper venue, couldn’t say that the
plaintiff had waived its federal right to litigate in the federal forum.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
Id.
Id.
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964).
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One “essential characteristic” of the federal system is that its courts
“in the main ‘have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
127
which is given, then to usurp that which is not given.’” How and
when they’ll step back from their “virtually unflagging obligation . . .
128
to exercise the jurisdiction given them” is a question of federal law.
No state can stop a federal court from deciding a case within its juris129
diction, even by enacting a statute to that effect. Nor can a state
make an end-run around this rule by declaring the plaintiff to have
“waived” its right to a federal forum, and then expecting federal
courts to follow along.
The other possibility is that state courts might reject agreements
that federal courts would accept as fair. For instance, a state might disregard forum selection entirely, or might limit it in particular fields
(such as construction)—ignoring bargains between sophisticated parties that were neither unjust nor unreasonable, that were freely negotiated on a level playing field, and that involved one party making
130
permanent commitments in exchange for another’s promise. If a
131
plaintiff “flouts” that promise, is the federal court supposed to ignore this unfairness, simply because the state courts would do so?
In many Erie cases, the answer is “yes,” because the federal court
is obliged to enforce state law. But federal courts typically use federal
law to define their own inherent powers, as these are beyond the
states’ power to abridge, enlarge, or modify. For example, the Supreme
Court has recognized as a general “principle” that “a court may resist
imposition upon its jurisdiction”—for instance, when a plaintiff might
“‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant” by suing in an improper
place, “inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to [the
132
plaintiff’s] own right to pursue his remedy.” Forum non conveniens
doctrine is theoretically based on this inherent power to prevent vexa-

126. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
127. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 747 (2012) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
128. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
129. See Chi. & N.W. R.R. Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. 270, 286 (1871); accord Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 313–14 (2006); Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 51, 68 (2012).
130. Cf. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 (2013) (noting that
the plaintiff’s agreement to a forum selection clause is typically given “in exchange for other
binding promises by the defendant”).
131. Id.
132. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1947); accord Sibaja v. Dow Chem.
Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1985).
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133

tious or oppressive litigation. And while the Supreme Court has
134
never decided the Erie issue, federal courts routinely apply this federal version of forum non conveniens as opposed to any conflicting
135
state doctrines. Likewise, the substantial majority of circuits treat
the doctrine of judicial estoppel—which the Court has described as
136
necessary “to protect the integrity of the judicial process” —as a
matter of federal law for Erie purposes, even when state law governs
137
the substance of the claim. The federal courts’ ability to resist impositions seems to be another “essential” aspect of their “independent
138
system,” one that it’s hard to imagine them subcontracting out to
the states to decide.
These inherent-powers doctrines bear a strong resemblance to forum-related waiver, which is also designed to prevent a party from
playing “fast and loose” with the courts and misusing the availability
139
of a federal forum. As the Court put it in Atlantic Marine, the point
of enforcing a forum selection agreement isn’t that it always has the
force of a state-law contract, but that the parties’ bargain “represents
140
[their] agreement as to the most proper forum,” which affects “their
legitimate expectations” as well as “vital interests of the justice sys-

133. See, e.g., Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 507–08; Sibaja, 757 F.2d at 1218.
134. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981).
135. See DTEX, LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., 508 F.3d 785, 793 (5th Cir. 2007); Esfeld v.
Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002); Caribbean Wholesales & Serv.
Corp. v. U.S. JVC Corp., 24 F. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2001); Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d
509, 511–12 (9th Cir. 2000); Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Can. Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 992 (10th
Cir. 1993); Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906 F.2d
45, 50 (1st Cir. 1990); Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 316 (6th Cir. 1974); 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 3828.5, at 726 (4th ed. 2013). But see Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100
YALE L.J. 1935 (1991) (arguing for state law).
136. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982)).
137. See, e.g., Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., 767 F.3d 987, 993 (10th Cir.
2014); Wells v. Coker, 707 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 94 (2013); Milton H.
Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 2012); G-I Holdings,
Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 247, 261 (3d Cir. 2009); In re Ark-La-Tex Timber Co., Inc.,
482 F.3d 319, 332 n.18 (5th Cir. 2007); Pennycuff v. Fentress County Bd. of Educ., 404 F.3d 447,
452 (6th Cir. 2005); Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996). That said, there is a
long-standing circuit split on the issue, as some courts apply state law on judicial estoppel instead. See Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Soczynski, 765 F.3d 931, 935 n.3 (8th Cir. 2014); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. S. Diamond Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1995);
Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937–38 (D.C. Cir. 1980); cf. Perry v. Blum, 629 F.3d 1, 8
(1st Cir. 2010) (describing the issue as still open in the First Circuit).
138. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
139. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013) (quoting Stewart
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988)).
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142

tem.” Letting a party “flout[]” a prior agreement, through the specific mechanism of filing a suit in a federal court, may well be the kind
of “perversion of the judicial process” that federal courts can legitimately guard against through their own federal standards for waiv143
er.
c. The Federal Standards We Have
Where these unwritten waiver standards come from—whether
144
they’re proclaimed by federal courts like mini-legislatures, or
whether they have to be derived from preexisting rules of common
145
law or equity —is a more complex topic than can be addressed here.
And none of this reasoning tells us what those unwritten standards
actually are; that is, what kinds of conduct actually cause a party to
waive its rights, to what extent these standards incorporate whatever
substantive contract law would otherwise apply, and so on. This Article holds no brief for any particular set of standards, and federal
waiver law has been extensively criticized on normative grounds—as
“a patchwork of concepts drawn from jurisdiction, venue, forum non
conveniens[,] and contract law,” lacking in “conceptual clarity,” and
146
“plagued by linguistic and analytical difficulties.”
Indeed, some criticisms of the use of federal law in forum selection have been primarily focused on substance, not federalism. Their
central claim is that the federal standard developed in The Bremen,
and especially as applied to consumer contracts in Carnival Cruise
147
Lines Inc. v. Shute, is too quick to enforce unfair agreements made
148
by unsophisticated parties. True or not, that claim lacks any clear relationship to the Erie question. If the difference went the other way—
if the federal courts had stuck to their pre-Bremen jurisprudence, exercising their statutory jurisdiction to its full extent—it’s hard to imagine a similar Erie critique even getting started. (With the federal
141. Id. (quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
142. Id. at 582.
143. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750 (quoting In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir.
1990)).
144. Cf. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (describing “socalled ‘federal common law’” as being “prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the
courts”).
145. See generally Nelson, supra note 111; Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution”
and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797; Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813 (2012).
146. See Mullenix, Another Choice, supra note 81, at 360, 365, 370.
147. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
148. See generally Mullenix, Gaming the System, supra note 81.
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courts standing ready to exercise their jurisdiction, how could a state’s
law take the case away?)
But whatever the applicable federal standards are, the fact that
they’re unwritten shouldn’t give us pause. Sometimes procedural rules
149
like these are codified, but they don’t have to be—and, in the feder150
al system, they usually aren’t. That personal jurisdiction and venue
“are personal privileges of the defendant, rather than absolute stric151
tures on the court, and both may be waived by the parties,” is just
something that competent practitioners and judges know, and not
something that statutes had to tell us. Whether those standards are
written or unwritten, forum selection involves “uniquely federal in152
terests,” and it needs to be assessed under federal law.
II. FORUM SELECTION AS DEFENSE
Recognizing that forum selection is a type of waiver helps explain
how the issue should come before a federal court. For permissive
agreements, the procedure is usually simple; whatever objections the
defendant has waived just go away. For mandatory agreements,
though, the matter is often more complex. In one common scenario, a
plaintiff subject to a mandatory forum selection agreement nonetheless files in a court other than the one the parties chose. Atlantic Marine identified two “appropriate” means of responding: a motion to
transfer venue among federal districts under § 1404, or a motion to
dismiss in favor of a state or foreign court under forum non conven153
iens.
Fortunately, though, the Court left the door open to other proce154
dures. If forum selection is really a type of waiver, then a mandatory
agreement waiving the right to sue in a given forum ought to serve as
a defense to recovery there, and it ought to be asserted like any other
defense—affirmatively stated in the answer or raised by appropriate
motion. At least three circuit courts of appeals have adopted this ap-

149. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 2010) (declaring valid certain
contracts’ choices of New York courts and New York law).
150. But cf. Dodson, Atlantic Marine, supra note 1, at 687–88 (arguing that beyond § 1404,
“no codified law appears to allow ex ante waiver” in federal courts); accord Shannon, supra
note 9, at 786 n.49 (questioning the grounds for ex ante waiver).
151. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
152. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)).
153. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580–81 (2013).
154. See id. at 580 & n.4; see also Sachs, supra note 79, at 763–64.
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proach (or something like it), as has the Wright & Miller treatise,
and it has both theoretical and practical advantages over its competitors. And while nothing’s perfect, any problems that result from recognizing forum selection as a defense can be corrected through
straightforward amendments to the Federal Rules.
A. Why Forum Selection Is a Defense
Viewing a mandatory forum selection agreement as a defense follows rather naturally from viewing it as a waiver. A plaintiff that’s
given up the right to sue in a particular forum shouldn’t be allowed to
recover there. Otherwise, the waiver doesn’t mean very much. The
157
fact that this is a forum “to which the parties waived their right” is a
reason why the plaintiff should go home without relief. That’s the
classic definition of a defense: a reason why this particular court, at
this particular time, shouldn’t award the relief that the plaintiff
158
seeks.
The same reasoning applies even if Part I of this Article were entirely wrong, and a mandatory forum selection agreement—which, for
simplicity’s sake, this Part just calls “forum selection”—were purely a
matter of contract. If the parties have a binding contract not to litigate
in a particular forum, and the plaintiff files there anyway, then the
court ought to award some kind of remedy for that breach. Often the
proper remedy, as a matter of equity, will be specific performance of
their obligation not to litigate—which is usually achieved by prevent159
ing the plaintiff from continuing the suit. Either way, the forum selection agreement serves as a reason why the plaintiff should lose.
In fact, from the standpoint of contract law, specific performance
160
makes far more sense than subsequent claims for damages. Part of
the problem is that, in the forum selection context, the standard rem-

155. See, e.g., Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 933–34 (6th Cir. 2014); Rivera v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009); Salovaara v. Jackson Nat’l
Life Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 289, 298–99 (3d Cir. 2001).
156. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 135, § 3803.1, at 93 & n.82 (4th ed. 2013) (“The
better view . . . is that a [valid] forum selection clause . . . should be enforced by either a Section
1404(a) transfer or a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”) (citing cases).
157. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583.
158. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 509 (defining “defense”).
159. See generally Staring, supra note 2; see also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (“The correct approach would have been to enforce the forum clause specifically . . . .”).
160. Cf. Dodson, Atlantic Marine, supra note 1, at 677 (discussing contract actions after
breach).
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edy of expectation damages is very uncertain. If the plaintiff sues
somewhere other than the chosen forum, how much has the defendant really lost in dollar terms? Would the defendant need to prove (by
a preponderance of evidence) that the case would have come out dif161
ferently in the chosen court? How much should we weigh the uncertainty caused by the change, the defendant’s unfamiliarity with procedures or personnel, the need to find a lawyer admitted to the court’s
bar, the potential differences in choice of law, and so on? When a
damages remedy “affords inadequate protection” against the other
party’s deliberate breach, we often impose a disgorgement remedy instead, requiring the party at fault to turn over its profits without need162
ing to measure the innocent party’s losses. But a plaintiff’s profits
from the misfiled suit are whatever it recovers in the judgment, minus
costs and attorney’s fees—meaning that, after the defendant pleads a
counterclaim and set-off for breach, the plaintiff’s net recovery will
always be zero. So instead of going through that pointless exercise,
courts usually award specific performance, treating the forum selection clause as a bar to recovery rather than letting the suit go forward
163
and trying to calculate damages afterwards.
While the Supreme Court hasn’t explicitly declared forum selection to be a defense, that view underlies some of its cases. In Lauro
164
Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, for example, the Supreme Court indicated that
a mandatory agreement can bar the plaintiff’s recovery in other
courts. The district court in Lauro Lines had refused to enforce the
parties’ agreement, and the defendant tried to appeal under the col165
lateral order doctrine, which addresses errors that are “effectively
166
unreviewable” after final judgment. The Court determined, though,
that the issue could be fully addressed in an ordinary appeal. Because
the forum selection clause conferred a binding “entitlement to be
sued only in a particular forum,” any relief that the district court
167
might award would constitute reversible error. In a concurrence,
161. Cf. 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 3855, at 402–04, 409 n.11 (4th ed. 2013) (describing the difficulty of this inquiry with regard to appealing venue transfer decisions).
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39(1) (2011).
163. See id. cmt. a (noting that courts often use specific performance “[w]here a party’s contractual entitlement would be inadequately protected by the legal remedy of damages for
breach,” and treat disgorgement as an “after the fact” remedy when “the defendant can no
longer be required to perform”).
164. 490 U.S. 495 (1989).
165. Id. at 497.
166. Id. at 498 (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. at 501.
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Justice Scalia made clear that the remedy for the district court’s mis168
take was “permitting the trial to occur and reversing its outcome.”
That remedy can only be available if a judgment for the plaintiff
would be legally erroneous, which means that the district court was
supposed to have denied relief in the first place—which means that
forum selection is a defense. The Court repeated this characterization
in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., where it rejected
169
collateral-order appeals based on private settlement agreements.
The Court explained that settlements, like forum selection agreements, involve “one private party secur[ing] from another a promise
170
not to bring suit” under particular circumstances; such a promise
171
confers a “broad defense to liability,” and it supports an appeal from
172
any final “judgment [in] the plaintiff’s favor.”
The fact that forum selection can be a defense, though, doesn’t
mean that it can only be a defense. There are plenty of procedural
means for invoking a forum selection agreement, and a party has the
right to elect its remedy. For instance, if the parties agreed to litigate
only in state courts (and not to remove), it’d be very strange to deny
recovery to a plaintiff who properly sues in state court and then has
the case improperly removed by the defendant. In that case, the right
response would be for the plaintiff to move for remand (or for dismis173
sal for forum non conveniens), sending the case back to the forum
in which he had the right to sue. Likewise, if the defendant chooses to
move for a transfer under § 1404, then some of the considerations
usually relevant to § 1404 motions still apply. The plaintiff’s waiver of
the right to sue might wipe out any “right to challenge the preselected
174
forum as inconvenient,” but it doesn’t let the court ignore “public175
interest considerations” under a statute that requires action “in the
176
interest of justice.” (Or, if the defendant seeks a transfer to another
forum barred by the agreement, the defendant’s own waiver could be

168. Id. at 502–03 (Scalia, J., concurring)
169. 511 US. 863 (1994).
170. Id. at 880.
171. Id. at 871.
172. Id. at 881.
173. See sources cited supra note 117.
174. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 (2013).
175. Id. at 581.
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). These public-interest considerations might also affect
whether the forum selection agreement is enforceable on its own terms. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972) (discussing whether enforcement might “contravene
an important public policy of the forum”).
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invoked by the plaintiff. )
B. Raising the Forum Selection Defense
The Federal Rules also provide a means of raising the forum selection defense: by pleading it in the answer, seeking summary judgment, or, in many cases, by raising it on motion under Rule 12.
1. Answer and Summary Judgment
If forum selection is a defense, then it has to be pleaded as a defense. The proper way to raise defenses under the Federal Rules is to
plead them in the answer. Rule 12 is unequivocal: other than the seven special defenses that “a party may assert . . . by motion”—such as
jurisdiction, venue, or improper service—“[e]very defense to a claim
for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading
178
if one is required.” That accords with Rule 8’s requirement that a
party state in the responsive pleading “its defenses to each claim as179
serted against it.”
In fact, if a party fails to plead forum selection in its answer, it
ought to forfeit the defense. Under Rule 8, a defendant’s answer has
180
to “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense,” lest
181
the defense be “forfeited” and “exclu[ded] from the case.” Forum
selection is an affirmative defense, according to the ordinary definitions of the term; it can’t be raised “by a simple denial in the an182
swer,” and it can bar recovery “even if all the allegations in the
183
complaint are true.” The existence of a forum selection agreement
usually doesn’t negate any element of the plaintiff’s claim, but represents an independent reason for the court to deny relief. Rule 8’s nonexclusive list of affirmative defenses even mentions “waiver” as a spe184
cific example.
177. See, e.g., GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2014).
178. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (emphasis added).
179. Id. 8(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
180. Id. 8(c)(1) (emphasis added).
181. Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1832 (2012) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1271, at 585 (3d ed. 2004).
183. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 509.
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). This rule has been interpreted as applying not only to substantive waivers (as of contractual rights through subsequent courses of conduct), but also to procedural ones. See, e.g., Zephyr Aviation, L.L.C. v. Dailey, 247 F.3d 565, 571 n.8 (5th Cir. 2001)
(failure to exhaust administrative remedies); see also R.H. Cochran & Assocs. v. Sheet Metal
Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 33, 335 F. App’x 516, 518–19 (6th Cir. 2009) (failure to
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Pleading forum selection as a defense, though, doesn’t mean that
the issue has to wait until trial. Instead, the defendant can get an early
ruling on the question by motion. For starters, whatever a party might
argue at trial, it can also raise on a motion for summary judgment.
185
Those motions have an end date (30 days after discovery), but no
starting date; as the Advisory Committee noted, Rule 56 lets the parties seek summary judgment “at the commencement of an action” if
186
they want. So the defendant can file its motion as soon as the com187
plaint comes in, attaching the forum selection agreement as an exhibit and arguing that it bars recovery. Usually the parties will agree
that the exhibit is authentic, and their only real disputes will involve
188
issues of law—how the clause should be interpreted, what standard
governs its validity, and so on. If so, there’s “no genuine dispute as to
189
any material fact,” and the court can resolve the legal issues directly
under Rule 56. If there do happen to be facts in dispute—say, over the
parties’ relative bargaining power, or the circumstances that might
render the agreement unfair or unreasonable—then the court can authorize focused discovery under Rule 56(d)(2) and (3), resolving the
forum selection issue without needing to proceed any further in the
190
case.
2. Rule 12 Motion
Often a defendant can get a quick ruling on forum selection without resorting to summary judgment, by using a Rule 12(c) or 12(b)(6)
motion instead. Many complaints in contract cases incorporate the
underlying contract as an exhibit, making it part of the pleading for all
191
purposes under Rule 10. (Or, if a non-included contract is discussed
extensively, many courts will declare it to be incorporated anyway, so

raise timely objections in arbitral proceedings).
185. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b).
186. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (2010), 28 U.S.C. app. at 268 (2012).
187. Cf. id. (noting that a Rule 56 motion might be “premature until the nonmovant has
had time to file a responsive pleading,” which won’t be a problem if the defendant is the movant).
188. Cf. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 332 (2004) (“As a general rule, the construction of a
contract is a question of law for the court.”).
189. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
190. And even if the court denies or defers the motion under Rule 56(d)(1), the defendant
can still get the chance to file others. Courts regularly accept successive summary judgment motions for good cause. See 11 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.121[1][b],
at 300 & n.5 (3d ed. 1997).
191. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”).
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192

long as both parties agree on what it says. ) At this point, with the forum selection agreement forming part of the plaintiff’s complaint, the
defendant has two options. The traditional course would be to raise
the forum selection defense in the answer and then file a Rule 12(c)
193
motion for judgment on the pleadings. But if the complaint already
incorporates a valid forum selection agreement, there’s no need even
to file an answer; the complaint on its face reveals an affirmative defense to liability, which many courts (including the Supreme Court)
194
take as a failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
That practice stretches the Rule’s language somewhat. Defendants
don’t have to plead affirmative defenses if they don’t want to, and until they do, the complaint really does state a claim on which the court
can grant relief. So the practice of raising an affirmative defense on a
195
12(b)(6) may result from a misreading of the Rule. But the best argument in favor of the courts’ position would go something like this.
Sometimes, just from reading the complaint, we already know that the
plaintiff ought to lose. (Say, because the allegations concern decades196
old events way outside the statute of limitations. ) If the defendant
raises the issue by motion, then arguably the plaintiff’s claim is no
longer one “on which relief can be granted”—which sounds more like
12(b)(6) territory. This was the reasoning employed by the Supreme
Court in Jones v. Bock: so long as “the allegations in the complaint
suffice to establish” a “ground for opposing a claim,” that claim can be
197
dismissed, whatever “the nature of the ground in the abstract.” And
if a valid forum selection agreement is made part of the complaint,
then the pleading itself reveals a reason to deny relief, and the case
can be dismissed on a 12(b)(6).

192. See, e.g., DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable LLC, 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010); see also 5B
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182, § 1357, at 376 & n.1 (3d ed. 2004) (compiling sources).
193. See Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).
194. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (quoting Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156,
161 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 192, § 1357, at 708–10 & nn.62–
63 (compiling sources).
195. See Brownmark Films, 682 F.3d at 690; 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182, § 1277,
at 626–28; Rhynette Northcross Hurd, Note, The Propriety of Permitting Affirmative Defenses to
Be Raised by Motions to Dismiss, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 411 (1990); Michael E. Rosman, Affirmative Defenses and Rule 12(b)(6): A Plain Meaning Interpretation, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 20, 2012, at
4, available at http://ssrn.com/id=2206027.
196. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182, § 1226, at 306 n.10.
197. 549 U.S. at 215.
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Because this kind of 12(b)(6) dismissal will often be available, and
because it’s highly sought after by defendants, the general approach of
viewing forum selection as an affirmative defense sometimes goes by
198
the label of “12(b)(6).” That’s somewhat of a misnomer, as a forum
selection defense can only be raised on a 12(b)(6) in certain favorable
circumstances—when the agreement is itself made part of the com199
plaint, or perhaps is available for judicial notice, and so on. Otherwise, the agreement constitutes “matters outside the pleadings,” which
the court has to exclude or convert into a motion for summary judg200
ment.
In fact, that treatment might also be necessary depending on how
the plaintiff tries to resist the forum selection agreement. To properly
litigate the case, the plaintiff might need to raise factual issues that
aren’t found in the pleadings—say, whether the forum selection
agreement is unreasonable or unjust under The Bremen, whether it’s
been subsequently rescinded by the parties, whether it was inserted in
the contract through fraud in the factum, and so on. These are all extremely unlikely to be discussed in the complaint, but they can’t easily
be excluded from consideration. They go directly to the merits of the
motion to dismiss, and Rule 12 requires that “[a]ll parties . . . be given
a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent
201
to the motion.”
That wrinkle follows directly from the tensions inherent in using
Rule 12(b)(6) to enforce affirmative defenses. Even a statute-oflimitations defense, the easiest candidate for this treatment, can require outside facts. (For example, whether the defendant had previously agreed out of court to waive the defense, whether it’s subject to
equitable tolling for various reasons, and so on.) Plaintiffs aren’t required to anticipate defenses in their complaints, so these issues aren’t
easy to hash out on the pleadings. Nonetheless, because these issues
arise relatively rarely, a Rule 12 motion will be available most of the
time—and the “12(b)(6)” label is largely accurate.
C. Criticisms and Responses
Treating forum selection as a defense has attracted the support of
several courts and commentators. It’s also made an appearance, albeit
198.
199.
200.
201.

See, e.g., Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580 (2013).
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
Id.
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a silent one, in the Supreme Court’s case law; the defendant in Lauro
Lines, whom the Court considered protected from recovery outside
the chosen court, had raised its forum selection defense in a motion to
202
dismiss “pursuant to Rules 12(b) and 56.”
That said, scholars and judges have been generally hostile to the
idea, either because they see it as theoretically confused or as practically awkward. In fact, much of the confusion and awkwardness lies
on the other side. Treating forum selection as an affirmative defense is
not only correct as a theoretical matter, but provides substantial practical advantages. To the extent that there are any practical defects with
this approach (as there always are), they can be corrected with a relatively straightforward amendment to the Federal Rules.
1. Criticisms in Theory
To date, the main objections to treating forum selection as a defense have been theoretical. Defenses, answers, summary judgment,
12(b)(6): these things are all supposed to be about “substantive
203
204
205
rights,” not “procedural” or “non-merits based” issues that apply
206
only “in a particular court.” At oral argument in Atlantic Marine,
Justice Kagan went so far as to describe the argument as “a bit of a
207
category error,” mixing up questions of who should win and where
to hold the fight.
But these worries themselves get the categories wrong. The distinction between merits and non-merits arguments is a distinction between different kinds of defenses, not among the particular procedural
vehicles used to raise them. Answers, summary judgment, and Rule
12(b)(6) are routinely used to litigate defenses that are procedural,
that don’t go to the merits, or that might be limited only to a particular court. Using these devices for forum selection is nothing new.
202. Joint Appendix at 2–3, Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (No. 88-23),
1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 620, at *2–3.
203. Martin Davies, Forum Selection Clauses in Maritime Cases, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 367, 375
(2003) (describing the use of Rule 12(b)(6) for forum selection as “heresy”).
204. Shannon, supra note 9, at 790 (emphasis omitted); see also id. (reserving Rule 12(b)(6)
“for the enforcement of merits-based defenses,” and arguing that forum selection “has nothing
to do with the merits, but rather relates only to the identity of the proper forum” (emphasis
omitted)).
205. Dodson, Atlantic Marine, supra note 1, at 686 n.58 (arguing that forum selection “fit[s]
uncomfortably within a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, to say nothing of a Rule 12(c) or Rule 56 judgment”).
206. Staring, supra note 2, at 408.
207. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134
S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929) (2013) [hereinafter Atlantic Marine Transcript].
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a. Procedural Defenses
Unlike the typical defense raised on a 12(b)(6) motion, a forum
selection defense is procedural rather than substantive. But the Federal Rules’ default method for raising defenses doesn’t distinguish between procedure and substance. Rather, it instructs that “[e]very defense to a claim for relief . . . must be asserted in the responsive plead208
ing.” The seven special defenses listed in Rule 12(b)—which all
happen to be procedural—can be raised by pre-answer motion, but
they don’t have to be. So long as the defendant avoids making any
Rule 12 pre-answer motions on other grounds, it’s enough to plead jurisdiction, venue, or improper service in the answer, which avoids any
209
waiver and preserves those defenses for future use.
In fact, the Rules require defendants to plead a number of procedural defenses in the answer, depending on what one calls “procedural.” That the claim is subject to issue preclusion, that it’s barred by
laches, that the plaintiff lacks capacity to sue and be sued in this forum, that there’s an unmet condition precedent to suit (like exhaustion of administrative remedies or a pre-filing notice requirement); all
of these are usually thought of as issues of procedure, not substance.
210
Yet all of them must also be “affirmatively stated” in the answer,
211
212
perhaps even “specific[ally]” or “with particularity.” And if any of
these defenses should be apparent from the face of the complaint—
say, because it alleges that the plaintiff is only 17 years old, or that the
plaintiff has sued and lost before—then that defense can be raised
213
through the vehicle of Rule 12(b)(6), regardless of its “nature.” Forum selection is hardly unusual in this regard, and there’s no reason to
treat it differently.
b. Non-Merits Defenses
In the Atlantic Marine oral argument, Justice Kagan suggested
that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is an “on-the-merits determination”
214
with “res judicata effect.” Forum selection isn’t like that, of course;
filing suit in the wrong court won’t always bar you from refiling in the
right court. So, the argument goes, forum selection is an inappropriate
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
See id. 12(h)(1)(A), (B)(ii).
Id. 8(c)(1) (estoppel, laches).
Id. 9(a)(2) (capacity).
Id. 9(c) (conditions precedent).
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).
Atlantic Marine Transcript, supra note 207, at 14.
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ground for 12(b)(6)—much less a judgment under 12(c) or 56.
The problem with this preclusion argument is its first premise.
Like an unfavorable judgment, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is only
sometimes, not always, preclusive on the merits. Suppose that the contract in a debt collection case, incorporated as an exhibit to the complaint, conclusively reveals that the sued-on debt isn’t due for another
month. Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment would all be perfectly correct ways to dispose of this
premature lawsuit; on the face of the complaint, the plaintiff should
lose. But none of these procedural vehicles would bar the plaintiff
from returning to court in a month’s time if the debt were still unpaid.
Rather, the judgment’s preclusive effect is to bind the parties on the
215
issue of when the debt comes due, not whether it’s owed at all. (The
same is true if the plaintiff will be turning 18 next month, or will have
exhausted its administrative remedies by then, or . . . )
Under Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp, the
preclusive effect of a dismissal or judgment isn’t decided by the Federal Rules, but by separate doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, which look to the type of defense and not to the procedural
216
vehicle by which it’s raised. A statute-of-limitations defense, for example, is the stereotypical affirmative defense raised under Rule
217
12(b)(6), yet it doesn’t necessarily bar suit in federal courts in other
218
states. Certain kinds of substantive losses, of course, will wipe out a
219
claim even after a favorable change in substantive law. But a forumselection dismissal—like a dismissal for forum non conveniens—
“‘den[ies] audience to a case on the merits,’” deciding only “that the
220
merits should be adjudicated elsewhere.” As the Supreme Court
held in Costello v. United States, a dismissal or other judgment that
doesn’t reach the substance, one that’s ultimately “based on a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a precondition . . . to determin[ing] the
merits of his substantive claim,” is generally considered to be without
221
prejudice under Rule 41. As Semtek explains, that “ordinarily . . .
215. Cf. Bradley Scott Shannon, Dismissing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, 52 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 265, 277–81 (2014) (describing a variety of similar nonpreclusive dismissals).
216. See 531 U.S. 497, 506–07 (2001).
217. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 215.
218. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504.
219. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 4415, at 369–70 & nn.38–39 (2d ed. 2002).
220. Sinochem Int’l v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007) (alteration in
original; quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)).
221. 365 U.S. 265, 285 (1961).
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[has] the consequence of not barring the claim from other courts.”
Because a forum selection agreement makes filing suit in the chosen
forum a precondition to reaching the merits, a dismissal on forum selection grounds wouldn’t always prevent the plaintiff from trying
222
again in another court —or even in the same court, should the defendant be willing to waive this defense.
c. Court-Dependent Defenses
Some commentators have viewed the 12(b)(6) device as “highly
strained, because failure to state a claim ordinarily is the apparent
lack of any substantial right and not just the inability to enforce it in a
223
particular court.” But other defenses are also specific to particular
courts. For example, a judgment with prejudice under Rule 41 definitely bars the plaintiff from refiling the same claim in the same court,
but it doesn’t always serve as a bar in any other courts, state or feder224
al. So if the case had been dismissed by, say, the Central District of
California, then preclusion might represent a good defense in the
Central District, whether or not it’d work anywhere else. And if the
complaint in the second suit happened to describe what went on in
the first, then preclusion would be a perfectly good ground for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
More generally, there’s nothing strange about forum selection being a defense to liability that applies only in particular courts. The essence of the Court’s holding in CompuCredit is that one may have a
substantive right—even a nonwaivable right—“to impose liability” on
another party without having a similar right to do so “in all competent
225
courts.” Like venue or personal jurisdiction, forum selection is a
good defense in some districts but not others. But unlike those defenses, it hasn’t been given a special status under Rule 12(b), and so
should be treated like any other affirmative defense.
d. The No-Rule Alternative
One other criticism of relying on Rule 12(b)(6) is that we might
not need any rule to rely on in the first place. Bradley Shannon has
222. That said, deliberately abusive suits in multiple courts might produce a different response. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20, cmt. n (1982) (noting that “estoppel
or laches” may bar a second suit when “it would be plainly unfair to subject the defendant to a
second action”); Sachs Brief, supra note * , at 26 n.14.
223. Staring, supra note 2, at 408.
224. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506.
225. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 671 (2012) (emphasis omitted).
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argued that courts can dismiss cases on motion merely for violating a
forum selection agreement, without citing any particular provision of
226
the Federal Rules. This, in fact, seems to be common practice in fo227
rum non conveniens dismissals, perhaps because modern forum non
conveniens doctrine only took shape after the Federal Rules were in
228
place. But there’s no obvious legal basis for this practice. If personal
jurisdiction, venue, and failure to join a necessary party aren’t too
229
procedural to be called “defenses” by Rule 12(b), then neither is forum non conveniens—in which case it, too, should fall within that
Rule’s catchall requirement that “[e]very defense,” other than the
230
special seven, “be asserted in the responsive pleading.” (Judicial es231
toppel also proceeds from the courts’ inherent powers, but “estop232
pel” still has to be pleaded under Rule 8(c). ) In any case, even if the
courts have created an ad hoc exception for forum non conveniens,
there’s no reason to extend their error to forum selection.
2. Criticisms in Practice
Other criticisms of the forum selection defense are based in practice, not theory. Compared to the mechanisms the Court approved in
Atlantic Marine—of § 1404 transfer or forum non conveniens dismissal—advancing a forum selection defense may take too long to resolve; may require a jury trial on contested facts; and may create unfairness when the statute of limitations has lapsed.
In fact, none of these criticisms holds much weight. A forum selection defense can be advanced quickly on motion and may be waived if
the defendant delays in raising it. While a jury trial might be necessary
in unusual cases, that’s an entirely appropriate way to proceed in a jury case, and it’s the same procedure we use to protect other defendants enforcing prior settlements or arbitration awards. And although
plaintiffs who file in the wrong forum may find themselves outside the
limitations period, that may not always be unfair—and when it is,
judges can invoke § 1404 sua sponte instead.
226. Shannon, supra note 9, at 792–93.
227. See id. at 793; see also Atlantic Marine Transcript, supra note 207, at 20 (“JUSTICE
KENNEDY: You just cite Gulf Oil, and that’s it?”).
228. See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
229. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (“But a party may assert the following defenses by motion:
. . . .”); id. 12(b)(2), (3), (7).
230. Id. 12(b).
231. See Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 779 (3d Cir.
2001); see also supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text.
232. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (“estoppel”).
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a. Timing
Transfers under § 1404 have two alleged advantages with respect
to timing. First, an eager defendant can get the case transferred quickly, because a § 1404 motion may be made at virtually any time—even
233
before all defendants have been served with process. Second, a dilatory defendant will have reasons to move quickly, because a court has
234
discretion to deny a § 1404 motion that’s filed too late in the game.
By contrast, the argument goes, if the forum selection agreement
hasn’t been made part of the plaintiff’s complaint, then ordinarily it
wouldn’t be possible to raise the defense until the defendant files an
answer. That means the defendant has to “admit or deny” all of “the
235
allegations asserted against it,” after conducting an “inquiry reason236
able under the circumstances” —which could mean an enormous
amount of unnecessary investigation. If the defendant wants to raise
any other pre-answer motions, it’ll have to litigate those first, in a
court that ostensibly shouldn’t even be hearing the case. Moreover,
some claim that even if the agreement were incorporated in the complaint, a dilatory defendant wouldn’t have to raise the issue by preanswer motion; instead, it could raise the affirmative defense in its an237
swer and then wait to litigate the issue at trial.
These worries, though, are overblown. If the agreement isn’t incorporated in the pleadings, a defendant that wants an early decision
on forum selection can bring a pre-answer motion for summary judg238
ment, which can involve as many “matters outside the pleadings” as
it likes. As noted above, summary judgment can be sought as soon as
239
the case is filed, even “at the commencement of an action.” So eager
defendants can bring up forum selection defenses as early as they
choose.
Even were summary judgment not available, making defendants
wait to process forum selection as a defense would hardly be that
much to ask. The Federal Rules expect just the same of defendants
that have already settled the case, already completed an arbitration,
233. See 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 161, § 3844, at 64 & n.20.
234. See id. at 64 & n.25; see also In re Apple Inc., 456 F. App’x 907, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
235. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(1)(B).
236. Id. 11(b).
237. See Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2006)
(making this criticism); Ryan T. Holt, A Uniform System for the Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1913, 1924 n.70 (2009) (same).
238. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
239. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (2010), 28 U.S.C. app. at 268 (2012).
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or already litigated the case to judgment and won: “release,” “arbitration and award,” “res judicata,” and “estoppel” are all ordinary af240
firmative defenses under Rule 8. Each of those defenses involves
just as much need for certainty, efficiency, and repose as would a fo241
rum-selection agreement.
Nor can a dilatory defendant feel safe bringing up the forum selection issue late in the game. The issue be forfeited if not “affirma242
tively state[d]” in the answer; and while answers can be amended
243
244
under Rule 15, leave may be denied after an unnecessary delay.
And if the defendant waits too long to seek judgment on the issue,
continuing to litigate in the “wrong” forum, there’s a strong likelihood
that the plaintiff’s waiver of the right to sue may itself be waived. A
defendant that sleeps on its rights, proceeding with the suit even while
ostensibly objecting to the forum, may be found to have lost any fo245
rum selection defense.
b. Factfinding and Jury Trial
A second difference between forum selection and the other alternatives involves factfinding. Under Rule 43, the court conducts all
factfinding relevant to a motion—including a motion under § 1404 or
246
forum non conveniens. That’s not the case, though, for motions under Rules 12(b)(6), 12(c), or 56. Under Rule 12(d), if “matters outside
the pleading” are involved, the first two motions will be converted into the third; and if those matters present “genuine dispute[s]” as to
“material fact[s],” summary judgment will be denied and the issues
247
left for trial. As the Court noted in Atlantic Marine, the prospect of
waiting for a jury trial—as compared to a quick ruling from the
bench—will likely encourage many defendants to seek relief by some

240. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
241. See Sachs Brief, supra note * , at 20.
242. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
243. See 5C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 1394, at 555 (3d ed. 2004) (“A party may
avoid waiver by seeking leave from the district court to amend his pleading to interpose an affirmative defense that has been inadvertently omitted.”).
244. See 6 id. § 1488, at 764 (3d ed. 2010).
245. See 13D id. § 3569, at 526–28 & nn.83–84 (3d ed. 2008); id. § 3569, at 167–68 (Supp.
2014); see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983)
(same rule for arbitration); 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 135, § 3828, at 627 & n.17 (same
rule for forum non conveniens); see also Sachs Brief, supra note * , at 23–24.
246. See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(c) (“When a motion relies on facts outside the record, the court
may hear the matter on affidavits or may hear it wholly or partly on oral testimony or on depositions.”).
247. Id. 56(a).
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248

other motion instead.
The fact that § 1404 or forum non conveniens may sometimes be
more useful, though, doesn’t mean that the affirmative-defense approach is legally incorrect. Again, the wronged party has an election
of remedies, and can choose the one that best suits its purposes. In
fact, leaving genuine factual disputes to the jury makes a lot of sense.
Suppose that the parties really do disagree about the facts: whether
the contract was made under duress, whether the forum selection
clause was inserted by fraud, whether that’s even the plaintiff’s signature, and so on. If the parties have a Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial of the case as a whole, why shouldn’t the jury determine
these questions too—rather than have a judge send the case packing
on his or her own authority? Indeed, the real question is why a court
is allowed to keep these issues from the jury under § 1404. In the arbitration context, where speed and efficiency are no less important, disputes over the “making of the agreement” are required by statute to
249
proceed to “jury trial.” So are any factual questions involved in con250
struing a prior settlement, though settlements, too, are designed to
avoid further litigation. In any case, the number of truly genuine factual disputes over forum selection is likely to be small; most contracts
speak for themselves, and the relatively narrow scope of the “unfair”
251
and “unreasonable” exceptions under Carnival Cruise mean that
most objections to enforcement could be addressed as a matter of law.
c. Dismissal and Unfairness
If the wronged party can choose between dismissal and venue
transfer, why should it make much difference? In fact, one significant
change created by the forum selection defense has to do with the
statute of limitations. A § 1404 transfer preserves the original dates of
filing and service, as far as limitations periods are concerned. But if
the case is dismissed and refiled, then the plaintiff may actually be
barred forever if the statute of limitations has lapsed. That’s why, in
§ 1406, Congress provided for the option of transfer (and not just
252
dismissal) if venue turns out to have been laid in the wrong district.
248. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580 n.4 (2013).
249. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); see also Sachs Brief, supra note * , at 24–25.
250. See Anthony DiSarro, Six Degrees of Separation: Settlement Agreements and Consent
Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 288 n.77 (2010) (listing cases).
251. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–95 (1991).
252. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, trans-
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If, though, a case is mistakenly filed in violation of a forum selection agreement, then a dismissal without res judicata effect (as discussed above) may still turn out to be a death sentence if the limitations period has run out. How can this unfairness be justified?
The first thing to note is that the situation isn’t always unfair. In
the forum non conveniens context, courts sometimes require defend253
ants to waive limitations defenses when the case is refiled —but not
254
always. Treating forum selection as a defense isn’t any less dangerous, limitations-wise, than treating it as a ground for forum non conveniens dismissal—a historically accepted approach that the Court
255
specifically approved in Atlantic Marine. Moreover, if the plaintiff
had waived its right to file in that forum—and if this waiver is neither
256
“unreasonable” nor “unjust” —then the defendant is presumably entitled to have the case dismissed, and the loss of the claim is the plaintiff’s own fault. As the Court explained, “when the plaintiff has violated a contractual obligation by filing suit in a forum other than the one
specified in a valid forum-selection clause,” a “dismissal would work
no injustice on the plaintiff,” even if the statute of limitations has al257
ready run.
The second thing to note is that a dismissal remedy can actually
enhance fairness rather than undermine it. Under § 1404, a district
court can grant a venue transfer at either party’s request, or even sua
sponte. So if dismissal truly would work some great injustice, the court
can always intervene to transfer the case instead. But sometimes justice requires dismissal. For example, dismissal might be a more appropriate punishment for a plaintiff that has repeatedly sued in an incorrect forum solely in order to harass. In 1949, Congress amended
§ 1406 to make sure that the court retained the option of dismissing
the action instead of transferring, in case that outcome would be more
258
just. But if § 1404 were the only remedy for violating a forum selecfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”); see Goldlawr, Inc.
v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) (describing the statute’s purposes).
253. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1981).
254. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583 n.8 (citing Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31
(1955)).
255. See id. at 580; see also Marcus, supra note 3 (describing the history).
256. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
257. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583 n.8.
258. See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 81, 63 Stat. 89, 101; Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466; 14D
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 135, § 3827, at 555 (noting a pattern of dismissal “if the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably could have foreseen that the forum in which the suit was filed was improper
and that similar conduct should be discouraged”); Sachs, supra note 79, at 765 & n.25.
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tion agreement, then that option would be off the table.
One further problem with relying on § 1404 as the only remedy is
that it’s ill-suited to complex litigation. As I’ve noted in other work, in
a lawsuit with multiple claims and parties, a forum selection agree259
ment might cover only some of each. Atlantic Marine instructs
courts to grant § 1404 transfers much more freely when there’s a
260
mandatory forum selection agreement involved, but it didn’t specify
what to do when the agreement leaves certain claims or parties out.
This is a real problem, because § 1404 is an all-or-nothing inquiry: do
we transfer the whole action or not? Courts are already struggling to
decide whether (1) to sever claims and parties covered by forum selection agreements from those that are not, applying the Supreme
Court’s new § 1404 standards only to the former, or (2) to consider
the transfer motion with respect to the entire action, applying some
261
sort of amalgamated standard. By contrast, allowing a district court
to dismiss some claims and to retain others tailors the remedy to the
underlying right, and it reduces the risk of hamfisted all-or-nothing
decisions. In other words, permitting dismissal, and not merely transfer, enables courts to reach just results in a broader range of cases.
CONCLUSION
Forum selection, whether permissive or mandatory, is best understood as a form of procedural waiver. That means that it’s governed
by procedural law, and in particular by federal law in a federal court.
Under the current structure of the Federal Rules, moreover, mandatory forum selection is a defense, something that can be raised by
pleading or by dispositive motion.
This account is offered as the best understanding of current law.
That said, current law may not be so great. For example, the requirement that parties plead forum selection in the answer, and that genuine disputes of fact go to a full-blown trial, may interfere with the enforcement of perfectly valid forum selection clauses.
If so, there’s an easy remedy. The Judicial Conference could pro262
pose an amendment to Rule 12, creating a new “12(b)(8)” defense
of “violation of a valid forum selection agreement.” (To avoid a giant
259. See Sachs, supra note 79, at 771–73.
260. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581–83.
261. See In re Rolls Royce Corp., 775 F.3d 671, 679–81 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Sachs, supra
note 79, at 773 nn.83 & 86 (collecting sources).
262. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1) (2012).
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Erie kerfuffle, the rule itself could stay agnostic as to what makes such
agreements valid.) That defense could be made waivable under Rule
12(h)(1), could be listed as a non-merits defense under Rule 41(b),
and would automatically be subject to the judicial factfinding provisions of Rule 43(c). In other words, we could effectively recreate the
system that many courts of appeals maintained before Atlantic Marine, by which mandatory forum selection was viewed—without legal
263
basis, alas—as a nonstatutory defect in venue.
If we want to amend the Federal Rules, though, the right way to
do that is by amending the Federal Rules, “not by judicial interpreta264
tion.” Courts have to decide cases under the rules we have today.
And under those rules, forum selection is a form of waiver—and a defense.

263. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577–79.
264. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213 (2007) (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).

